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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

FRANK MADRID,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 981404-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Burglary,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202,
and Attempted Theft, a class A misdemeanor

(attempted theft of

property valued between $1000 and $5000), in violation of §§ 76-6404 and 76-4-101

(1995), in the Third Judicial District Court,

State of Utah, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston, judge, presiding.
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . See Addendum A (judgment and conviction) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
I.

Did Appellant receive ineffective assistance of counsel

where his attorneys failed to move to dismiss the burglary charge
for insufficient evidence?
Standard of Review:
counsel

[]

raised

evidentiary hearing
correctness.

for

"[A] claim of ineffective assistance of
the

first

time

on

appeal

without

an

[] presents a question of law" reviewed for

State v. Bryant, 1998 WL 469851 *2 (Utah App. 1998)

(citing State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992)).
"However,

''appellate

highly deferential.''"

review of counsel's performance

must

be

Id. (quoting State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d

461, 466 (Utah App. 1993); quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).
Preservation:

This issue is reviewable for the first time on

appeal because (1) Appellant is represented by new counsel, and (2)
the record is adequate for review.1

See State v. Hovater, 914 P. 2d

37, 40 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029
(Utah 1991)) .
II.

Did the trial court err in allowing the State to submit

a flight instruction where there was no evidence of flight?
Standard of Review:

"'[T]he propriety of a jury instruction

presents a question of law7" reviewed for correctness.
Carlson, 934 P. 2d 657, 659 (Utah Ct.App.1997)

State v.

(quoting State v.

Brooks, 833 P.2d 362, 363 (Utah Ct.App.1992)).
Preservation:

Appellant's challenge to the submission of the

flight instruction is preserved at R.110[176,215].
STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The

following

statutes

and

constitutional

provisions

are

determinative of the issues on appeal:
Amendment VI, United States Constitution:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.

1

A record is adequate for review for purposes of a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel "if the trial record is adequate
to permit decision of the issue." Humphries, 818 P. 2d at 1029.
There is ample information in the record of the case at bar to
determine the sufficiency issue presented on appeal.
See infra
Point I. Hence, a Rule 23B motion to remand is not requested nor
necessary to determine Madrid's ineffective assistance claim. See
Utah R. App. P. 23B (1998) .
2

Article T
.., ^jLiiux:
appear a:

Section ] ;

-1* -: Constitution:

..•fL.a'^uny Liie dccuseu ^nail hav e the right t :::
~d in person and by counsel.

(1- A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with
intent to commit a . . . theft.
(2; Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was
committed in a dwelling, :h- which event it is a felony of the
second degree.
Theft ., I J1 :ah Code A m :i § ; 5 6 404 (19:95) :
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.
Attempt

" .in ^wde An

L I . > . .

) :

(III ) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt
to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability
otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he
engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the
commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part,
conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the
offense,
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall
arise: (a) because the offense attempted was actually
committed; or (b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the
offense could have been committed had the attendant
circumstanrp.q been as the Rc-f - beli^u^H t-h^m t-n Vv-.
Criminal Responsibility For Direct Commission Of Offense Or
F' : ] Conduct Of Another, IJt^h roHe Ann § 76-9~9n? ficqr\
Every person, acting with the mental state iequired for the
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an
offense shall be criminally liable as a partv for- snch
conduct,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Frank Madrid (".Madrid") was charged by in.formati.on
with one count of burglary :.n violation of Utah Code Ann, § ~**.-^
2(

-'
3

' • • . p-

I u n p ^ r f - y i ra 1 n i a

$5000 in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
("R")

(1995) .

Record

at 1-3,36-38.

A warrant was issued, R.4, and Madrid was

tried before a jury.

R.110. The jury convicted Madrid of burglary

as charged and of the lesser included offense of attempted theft of
property valued between $1000 and $5000.

R.87-89; see Utah Code

Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-4-101.
Defense counsel challenged the State's request to submit a
flight instruction on the basis that there was no evidence of
flight

presented

instruction).

at

trial.

R.110[214-15];

R.80

(flight

Over counsel's objection, the trial court allowed

the instruction to go to the jury.

Id.

Madrid appeals from the

trial court's decision.
Defense

counsel

filed a motion

at the close of

Madrid's

preliminary hearing to dismiss the burglary charge for insufficient
evidence.

R.108[40].

Counsel argued that

"identification

is

lacking" on the basis that nothing linked Madrid to the burglary
insofar as he was only seen walking on the sidewalk and the other
person was never identified.

Id.

Moreover, although the victim

had subsequently spotted Madrid's car in the neighborhood, such
evidence was not sufficient to bind the case over given that Madrid
in fact resided a few blocks away from the burgled home.
The trial court denied defense counsel's motion.
42] .

Id.
R.108 [41-

However, Madrid's attorney did not renew the motion in the

form of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the close
of the State's case, nor did he move for a mistrial when the jury
returned its guilty verdict.

R.110.
4

Madrid appeals the burglary

convictior. -?: - he basis of insufficient evidence in the context of
a

, .;..

: ineiiective assistance of counsel.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Ray Paddoov

' PaddocK' • w^;/ Lw iixs dpaiiii^iiL

. ~ne basement:

:. a

home located at 985 East Elqin Avenue owned by a friend, Paul

construLL.-^i

*ork v_n L ne apartment ai±a nao .101 yen moved 11.

. -;.

Needing some tools which were located at. his place of work, Paddock

h

Paddock left, a ; J :ne doors

closed arri locked,

•

••. -- . .-ir-

including the back entrance used £y :.r:t __

acce^
Paddock returned tu fina a red Ford Escort parked in his usual
spot on s -treet runnina along the side of the home.

ia.
of

he proceeded v.
r

'P : lf^ [1251 .

tne bacK door and saw tna: ".' was aijar ana :>r.e

ne panes <^f glass ir- *~n<=* door window was broken.

^ "1 1 t * 1 '*~; \ .
*.

R.li • :.'12r.'

a d d o c k a s k e a t::e m a n w n a t h e w a s d o i n g i:= t h e y a r d ,

f •"

^^

**OL

answer and

instead

ran

^^

L**W

iea ^0.1.

i

Meanwhile, Paddock observed, another man, later identified as
Madrid,

Id.

walking

along

th-? sidewalk

toward

the

same

red

car.

Madrid responded that he had not been in the yard, and that r>r

had come from a van that was parked down the street.

Id.

Paddock

did not recall whether he saw the van referred to by Madrid.

Id.

However, Paddock noted that Madrid seemed "panicky" and was walking
quickly toward the driver's side of the red car. R. 110 [128] . Both
Madrid

and

the other

man got

into

the car and drove off.

R.110 [130] . Paddock wrote down the license plate number and called
the police.

R.110[128-29].

Paddock went into the house.

R.110[129].

At the top of the

stair, he saw his own stereo plus Reeve's stereo, computer and
about 10 0 compact discs packed in a duffle bag and box.

Id.

When

Paddock had left the apartment earlier, those items were in their
appropriate places throughout the house.

Id.

Sergeant James Nelson ("Nelson") of the Salt Lake City Police
Department ("SLCPD") investigated the report of a burglary at the
Reeves home.

R.110[158-59] .

He ran the license plate number

listed in the report. R. 110 [158] . He found that it was registered
to Frank Madrid and was linked to a car matching the description of
the car noted in the report.

Id.

The license plate number was

also linked to an address that was just a few blocks from the scene
of the burglary.

R.110 [161].

Nelson pulled a four-year-old photo of Madrid from a SLCPD
data base.

Id.

Based on that photo and with the assistance of a

computer, Nelson compiled a photo line-up with pictures of other
individuals that were similar in height, weight, hair and eye

6

color.2
di:t;

u

Td

c::e :::i-

be included.
-?*

Madrid

[i^-j.

,.

.

^

showed

the

lir.9 ur

;.:.., aair^n^^i'.In^
R.110[163-

* - iraddock

also

statea

': ;

On

' *->^->

•

ctiau aiiOt;i-.-i p n o t c

i

0

-L.I; t n ^

K :10':'""7"

;•

.January

spread

• -x . ive

i

Madria, however ,

month

Paddock i m m e d i a t e l y i d e n t i f i e d t h e p h o t o

looked like the m a n that: i ^mped the fence,
1 i r-<

one

„:^.. the s u s p e c t m a y o r m a y not

:*I:L.

as "h" ^ v : lie saw w<^ ' •• •,.- " ""
raa^ojA

about

.*-•

*

.. u •. i4 ; . . - • i .

-, 1998, an

arrest w a r r a n t

w a s a/pp • -: ~ :x :ie ::il

was

issued

--j

- -

and

Madrid
;

;

- *: •*•-

was never i d e n t i f i e d ui apprehended.
Mill!: 5 U M E N T

I.
MADRID WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
A S S I S T A N C E OF C O U N S E L W H E R E D E F E N S E C O U N S E L D I D N O T A R G U E T H A T
T H E E V I D E N C E W A S I N S U F F I C I E N T TO S U P P O R T THE B U R G L A R Y OR
ATTEMPTED THEFT CONVICTIONS.
The

Six-.:*

guarantees "

Amendment

^~

See

also

Utah

.

Const.

r i g h t r.« the p r e s e n c e of an
r

deficien*

_

Art

Constitution

.

S 12

(guaranteeing

r a t r- .,"-,111;"!I i I u i i,.,»ii,»i I I " .' i n e f f : e c I i v«•-

i

er.^oy

the

attorney).

a defendant, rti-.ist e s t a b l i s h that
so

States

._,.. ^ - _ _rinH~ - ; ri-rose^utions, t h e a c c u s e d s h a l l
i

defence."

United

below

1 1 p i e s t ; j \ \ n I i < >ii,

.is c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e
ar>

0 p-ject:^e

standard

was
of

p e r f o r m a n c e , t h e r e .is d r e a s o n a b l e p r o o a b i l i t y that the o u t c o m e of

2

M a d r i d d o e s not c h a l l e n g e
o e r s o n l i n ^ - v r ^ ~" a p p e a l .

M*/

propriety

f the

photo

or

the trial would have been different."

State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d

37, 39 (Utah 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Templin, 805
P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990)).
In assessing counsel's performance, there is a presumption
that he or she "rendered adequate assistance."

Taylor v. Warden,

905 P. 2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995) . Moreover, counsel's actions are not
questioned unless there is no possible tactical explanation.

Id.

As to prejudice, the United States Supreme Court in Strickland
noted,

"reasonable probability

undermine

confidence

in

is a probability

the

outcome."

466

sufficient
U.S.

at

to

694.

Furthermore, prejudice is assessed in light of "the totality of the
evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the errors
affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect
and how strongly the verdict is supported

by the record."

Id.

Under the foregoing criteria, the failure of Madrid's attorney
to move to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence and to
move to dismiss notwithstanding

the jury's verdict

amounts to

ineffective assistance in that it does not meet an

"'objective

standard of reasonableness,'" and it prejudiced the outcome of
Madrid's trial.

Hovater, 914 P.2d at 39 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 688).
A. The Failure Of Madrid's Counsel To Move To Dismiss The
Burglary Charge And To Move For A Mistrial Falls Below
Reasonable Professional Standards.
In the present case, it was not professionally reasonable nor
in any way conceivably tactical, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;
8

Taylor, 90s P ?d at 282. fry defense conn?^ 1 to n ^ arcru? a motion
..:_-.

..".. _-: :=- .. •-.

'_::ei'_. . :;d: J - J '-A.:

:-e

state rested ::r to move to dismiss the conviction after the jury
^+

returned
•:i:,

nil*-- verdi

~*~ because the evidence here does not

•_:.> „_<_:i.v. .-•__ . - _t:_„r crime.
In -rdei 10 secure t.\-j convictions, rhe State had the burden

-ri^"1

" * ,™^r^

"enter Leaj

01 ^ e:»^-;; t ^o

Paddock and Reeves)
An"

culpable Lty otT
engage [d]

with
u

O-2-ZL

[theft

bevond

• •

«L-U^X^

i ? . \ - nr t o ccmm. ".

- v

norne .^-r

,Z:,^

.-.:* .

Si a h ./ode

v - ov- :.qu.,cv; : 01

„.ii^ c\_. -.loo^n

constitut[ing]

.

; substantial

-

;..:i; .
step

toward

•

•.•- d ]

t .t .<-'

mauthorizea control u v a _~e property of another

with the purpose to deprive him thereof. " !'* ih Code An'

toi

t,i^ commission .

solicit led I

-.

theft] " Utah Oode An:.

1986)

(

76-6-404

burglary ana attempted theft, aiij that he]

equest [ed]

an accomplice'^

v3,:r --*.

- . . , _ .

• : i<

or tAci'CjLc; 10^

.,

^ . ^ . I M . . ,

i;r-;!-.r

conduct

]"

^-as^nir ! • -

ommandied

ncourage [d] ,

/o-2-202 H9v5y

r*r

.principal liability cl-

, - also State v. Hill, 727 P,2d J.21 , 222 (Utah
'

*• . ;

• -

|

_

1 e-niHT "

burglary beyond reasonaio^e aouDt; .
However, as defense counsel noted himself at the preliminary
h^^ 1
where

the buj.jj.ary occurred

' -"

*

or that
9

'--r ^L.herw:se aia-

burglary and attempted theft.

Accordingly, the jury must have had

a reasonable doubt as to Madrid's guilt, see Hill, 727 P. 2d at 222,
and reasonable counsel would have made the argument to dismiss the
charges and conviction.
Although this Court declined to address whether an attorney's
failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence falls below a
reasonable professional standard, see Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P. 2d
333, 338 (Utah App. 1991); see also infra Point I.B.

(discussing

case in further detail) , a review of the facts of this case in
light of other case law demonstrates the viability of a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence and, consequently, how defense
counsel's failure to do so falls below a reasonable standard of
professional responsibility.
The State presented the following circumstantial evidence in
support of the charges against Madrid:

Paddock arrived at his home

at eleven-thirty a.m. to find the back door ajar and a pane of
glass

in the door broken.

R.110[128].

Inside, a number of

electronics and compact discs belonging to his roommate and himself
were piled up and packed in boxes; the items were not in that place
or in that condition when he left the home earlier that morning.
R. 110 [129].

Prior to entering the home, Paddock saw a man run

across the back yard of his home and jump the fence enclosing the
yard.

R.110 [126] . Paddock asked the man what he was doing in the

yard, but the man did not respond.

Id.

Instead, the man jumped

into a red Ford Escort parked on the street alongside the home.
R.110 [128] .
10

Paddock simultaneously saw another man walk up the sidewalk
toward the same red car.

R.110[127].

According to Paddock, the

man was never seen on the premises of the house.

Id. Nonetheless,

Paddock testified that he asked the man what he was doing in the
yard.

Id.

The man replied that he was not in the yard, but rather

looking at a van parked down the street.
recall whether or not he saw the van.
the

man

seemed

R.110 [128] .

"panicky"

and

was

Id.

Id.

Paddock could not

According to Paddock,

walking

at

a

brisk

pace.

He then proceeded to hop in the driver's side of the

red Ford Escort and drove away.

R.110[130].

Paddock copied the license plate number of the red car and
reported

the burglary to the police.

R.110 [128-29] . Sergeant

Nelson of the SLCPD investigated the report.

R.100 [158-59] .

He

researched the license plate number and found that it was linked to
a red Ford Escort registered to Frank Madrid at an address that was
just a few blocks from the crime scene.

R.110[158].

Nelson then

compiled a photo line-up including a four-year old picture of
Madrid, the Appellant in this case.
the

incident,

Nelson

showed

R.110 [161] . One month after

Paddock

the

line-up

and

Paddock

identified the photo of Madrid as that of the man seen walking
along the sidewalk and who drove the red car away.

R. 110 [163].

Paddock then speculated that another person in the line-up may have
been the other individual seen running from the yard.

R.110 [171] .

At a live line-up conducted four months later, Paddock was unable
to identify Madrid.
Over

R.110[143,146].

two months

after

the burglary,
11

Madrid

was

arrested

pursuant to a warrant.

R.4.

The other individual seen jumping

over the fence, however, was neither identified nor apprehended.
Such evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to
the jury's verdict3, does not sufficiently support the burglary or
attempted theft convictions.

As an initial matter, the State did

not present any direct evidence establishing that Madrid "enter[ed]
or remain[ed] unlawfully" in the Paddock/Reeves residence "with the
intent to commit . . . theft,"

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1), or

that he exercised unauthorized control over the items inside. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404. Paddock testified only that he saw Madrid on
the public sidewalk running alongside the property, but that he was
never on the premises or actually

in the house.

Moreover,

out

the person

seen running

of

the yard

R.110 [127].
was

never

identified or apprehended and, therefore, no accomplice testimony
linked Madrid to the incident.

Finally, the State did not present

any evidence directly tying Madrid to the crime scene, such as his
fingerprints on any of the personal belongings found bundled in the
house.
The circumstantial evidence, which constitutes all of the
evidence in this case, likewise falls short of establishing the
elements of burglary or attempted theft and, in fact, are as
consistent with innocence as with guilt.

3

In State v. Hill, 727

For claims of insufficient evidence, a reviewing court
views the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a
light most favorable to the jury verdict.
Jury verdicts are
reversed where reasonable minds must have entertained a doubt as to
the defendant's guilt.
See State v. Vicrh, 871 P. 2d 1030, 1034
(Utah App. 1994).
12

P.2d 221 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court noted, " [w]here the
only evidence presented against the defendant is circumstantial,
the evidence supporting a conviction must preclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence.

This is because the existence of a

reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt."

Id. at 222 (citation omitted) .

Under this principle, Utah Courts have upheld

convictions

either directly or based on accomplice liability only

where the

circumstantial evidence was strong and did not support any
of innocence.

theory

For example, in People v. Morton, 11 P. 512 (Utah

1886), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a burglary conviction where it
was "impossible to account for the presence of the [defendant] " in
a

closed

store

except

to commit

larceny.

Id. at

513.

The

defendant was apprehended near the store's safe and a drill bit
suitable for boring into the steel safe was found on the floor
where he stood.
1966)

Id.; see also State v. Burch, 413 P.2d 805 (Utah

(affirming

circumstantial

burglary

conviction

supported

evidence;" defendant was apprehended

by

"strong

in burgled

building and seen running from room containing safe with materials
usable in burglary); State v. Johnson, 305 P.2d 488 (Utah 1956)
(affirming
defendant

burglary
was

seen

conviction
looking

based

in window

on
of

accomplice
burgled

liability;
store

while

companion was inside, and was then seen walking rapidly towards the
rear of the building); State v. Murphy, 489 P.2d 430 (Utah 1971)
(sufficient evidence to find defendant was principal in murder
where he drove codefendant to store, codefendant fatally shot owner
13

inside while defendant sat with car running, then defendant drove
codefendant to another car waiting one block away).
Conversely,

convictions

have

been

reversed

where

the

circumstantial evidence is ambiguous, leaving open a reasonable
doubt.

This is so even where the defendant had a close association

with the perpetrator and was seen at or near the crime

scene

shortly before or after the crime occurred.
For example, in Hill, the defendant went to an antiques shop
in Utah

and

interest.

discussed
727

P. 2d

with
at

the

222.

shop
The

owner

next

certain

day,

the

items
shop

of

owner

discovered that her store had been burgled and several items,
including those noted by defendant, were gone.

Id.

Police tracked

defendant to his home in Oregon and found some chairs from the Utah
store.

Id.

Defendant produced a bill of sale.

Id.

Meanwhile, an

interview with a third person revealed that a Jack Hall, who was
acquainted with defendant's brother, stole the items and took the
chairs to the defendant.

Id.

Although the evidence gave rise to

the hypothesis that defendant was an accomplice in the burglary,
the

Utah

Supreme

Court

reversed

because

the

evidence

also

"support[ed] a hypothesis that Hall committed the burglary without
the assistance, encouragement, or knowledge of [the defendant]."
Id.
One

year

later, the

Supreme

Court

similarly

reversed

an

aggravated robbery conviction for insufficient evidence in State v.
Kalisz. 735 P. 2d 60 (Utah 1987)

(per curiam) .

As in Hill, the

evidence against the defendant painted a suspicious picture but was
14

not enough to support the guilty verdict.

Id. at 61.

In that

case, the defendant Kalisz and a man named Remington test drove a
car from a used car lot.
several hours later.

Id.

Id.

Kalisz alone returned the car

Minutes before Kalisz returned the car,

a robbery at a shopping center was reported.
that he was with Remington all day.

Id.

Id.

Kalisz admitted

He claimed and that he

took Remington to a hospital, a story that was later proved to be
untrue.

Id.

A search of Kalisz's person, residence and the car

turned up no evidence of the robbery.
Reversing

the

aggravated

Id.

robbery

conviction,

the

Court

reasoned that the State failed to "present any evidence that placed
Kalisz at the scene of the robbery or in the getaway car or linked
him to the crime through possession of any of the stolen goods."
Id.

Moreover, the "circumstantial evidence connecting Kalisz to

Remington and the crime is insufficient to prove that Kalisz was
with Remington during or immediately after the robbery and that he
had the requisite mental state for the crime with which he was
charged."

Id.

Like Hill and Kalisz, the circumstantial evidence in this case
does not adequately establish that Madrid entered and remained
unlawfully in the Paddock/Reeves house with the intent to commit
theft, or that he in any way solicited or had knowledge of the
burglary and attempted theft that was occurring.
circumstantial

evidence

here

is

ambiguous,

"reasonable hypothesis of innocence."

In fact, the

leaving

open

a

Hill, 727 P.2d at 222.

First, as with the defendants in Kalisz and Hill, Madrid's mere
15

association with the perpetrator, temporal proximity to the crime,
and proximity to the crime scene is not a sufficient basis for the
burglary charge.

See, e.g., Kalisz, 735 P.2d at 61 (insufficient

evidence although defendant drove with perpetrator and returned
with car minutes after robbery was reported); Hill
evidence

although

defendant

was

at

burgled

store

(insufficient
day

before

incident and showed interest in and was later found with goods
stolen from store).
Moreover, the State presented no evidence indicating Madrid
"solicited or encouraged [the other man] to commit the burglary or
even knew that he was [doing] it."

Hill, 727 P.2d at 222.

Like

Kalisz, the evidence suggests only that Madrid and the unknown man
(the likely perpetrator of the crime) rode in a car together within
a relatively short time of the offense.

See, 735 P. 2d at 61.

Nothing suggests, however, that Madrid knew that the man jumping
over the fence and who got into his car seized an opportunity to
burgle a house while Madrid looked at a van parked down the street.
See id.; Hill, 727 P.2d at 222.
That the entire incident occurred in Madrid's neighborhood
further highlights the ambiguity of the evidence in this case.

As

opposed to being in a foreign neighborhood across town where he
might have no legitimate business, Madrid was walking along a
street just a few blocks from his own home when he was spotted
close to the crime scene and later identified in a photo line-up by
Paddock.

R. 110 [127,161,163-64] . It is not unusual for a person to

walk within his own environs and to be seen by other neighbors
16

doing so.

A person's neighborhood is the most likely place where

he or she would see something of interest (i.e., the van) and stop
to take a look simply by virtue of the fact that that is where they
spend a majority of their time.

Accordingly, there remains a

"reasonable hypothesis of innocence" to the extent that Madrid was
looking at a van in his own neighborhood while another person
seized an opportunity to burgle a home.

Hill, 727 P.2d at 222.

In addition, Madrid's allegedly panicked demeanor and his
quick pace to the car likewise does not tip the balance toward
sufficiency since nervous behavior on the part of a suspect, when
confronted about a possible crime, is as consistent with innocence
as it is with criminal behavior.

See, e.g., State v. Sykes, 840

P.2d 825, 828 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155,
158

(Utah App. 1992) .

In the present

case, Madrid was both

confronted about a possible crime to the extent that Paddock asked
Madrid what he was doing in the yard, even though, as Paddock
admitted, Madrid was never seen on the premises.

R.110[127].

Moreover, Madrid likely saw the other man jump over the fence and
thereby knew that something was up. Hence, he was conscious of the
other man's guilt which prompted his panic and his quickened pace.
This, however, does not suffice to support the convictions here
since it is not necessarily evidence of actual guilt for these
crimes in particular.

See infra Point II

(discussing Madrid's

behavior with regard to the trial court's erroneous submission of
a flight instruction).
In

sum,

the

evidence

in

the
17

present

case

is

entirely

circumstantial and does not "preclude every reasonable hypothesis
of innocence."

Hill, 727 P.2d at 222.

Hence, the State did not

present sufficient evidence to establish the elements of burglary
or attempted theft beyond a reasonable doubt.
weak

circumstantial

viability

evidence,

of a challenge

and

case

Id.

law

to the sufficiency

In light of the

demonstrating

the

of the evidence,

defense counsel's performance was deficient in that it did not meet
reasonable professional standards.
694.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

His deficient performance is underscored given that he raised

the identical issue at the preliminary hearing and therefore was
aware of the inherent weakness in the State's case.

R.108[40].

Moreover, there could have been no conceivable tactical reason
for defense counsel's failure given that he could have done so
outside the presence of the jury, thereby avoiding any risk of
bringing undue attention to facts less favorable to Madrid's case.
See Taylor, 905 P.2d at 282.

Accordingly, the first prong of the

Strickland test regarding a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is met here.
B. The Ineffective Assistance Rendered By Madrid's Counsel
Undermines Confidence In The Outcome Of The Trial.
In

addition

to

falling

below

reasonable

professional

standards, the failure of defense counsel to argue sufficiency of
the evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
In Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1991), this
Court held that the petitioner was not denied effective assistance
of counsel when his attorney failed to "argue the evidence was
18

insufficient

to

support

his

rape

conviction."

Id.

at

337.

Declining to address whether it fell below reasonable professional
standards to not argue sufficiency, the Court affirmed on the
alternate

basis that the trial outcome was not prejudiced

counsel's omission.

Id. at 338.

by

In so holding, the Court noted

that the evidence against the petitioner was "substantial" and
would was sufficient

in light of the high standard of review

applied to challenges regarding sufficiency of the evidence.
In particular, the evidence in Butterfield

Id.

included the testimony

of the rape victim and one other witness who was awakened by the
victim's screams just after the rape occurred, who saw defendant
naked from the waist down, "his genitals wet and dripping, " and who
observed "blood and seminal fluid on the complainant's clothing."
Id. at 337.
Butterfield is distinguishable since there was substantially
more evidence against the defendant in that case, it was more
compelling, and was not entirely circumstantial. Unlike the direct
victim testimony and the testimony of the witness who saw the
defendant and made a number of incriminating observations just
moments after the rape in Butterfield, there are no eyewitnesses of
the crimes alleged here.

Moreover,

the other evidence against

Madrid is entirely circumstantial and far less compelling of his
guilt.

Indeed, the evidence does not "preclude every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence," but rather leaves open the question of
whether he actually knew that the burglary was occurring.
Hill, 727 P.2d at 222; see supra Point I.A.
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See

Given the ambiguous nature of the evidence, a challenge to its
sufficiency
review

likely would have prevailed under the standard of

for

such

claims,

i.e.,

reasonable

minds

must

have

entertained a doubt as to Madrid's guilt since the evidence did not
"precluded every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."

Hill, 727

P.2d

(prejudice

at 222; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694

assessed under totality of circumstances of case).

Consequently,

where defense counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence, the outcome of trial was likely different than it would
have been had he done so.
In

light

of

challenge

the

attempted

theft

the

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

foregoing,

sufficiency
constitutes

of

defense

the

counsel's

evidence

ineffective

for

failure

burglary

assistance

of

to
and

counsel

because (1) it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness,
and

(2) but for

[] counsel's deficient performance, there is a

reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have been
different."

Hovater, 914 P.2d at 39 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694).
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING A FLIGHT INSTRUCTION
WHERE THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT MADRID WAS
"FLEEING" THE SCENE.
In the present case, Madrid objected to the admission of a
flight

instruction

on

the

basis

that

evidence to support the instruction.

there

was

insufficient

R.110 [214-15] .

The trial

court allowed the instruction, reasoning that the language, "if
any, " used therein alerted the jury that they were free to conclude
that the evidence did not support flight. R.110[215] ; R.80 (flight
20

instruction).

The trial court erred as a matter of law, however,

in that there was not sufficient evidence of flight to justify the
instruction.
instruction

See Carlson, 934 P. 2d at 659
presents

question

of

law

upon

(propriety of jury
review).

Moreover,

submission of the instruction prejudiced the outcome of the trial.
See

State v.

Bales, 675

P.2d

573, 576

(Utah 1983)

(applying

harmless error analysis regarding erroneous submission of jury
instruction).
"An instruction on flight is properly given if the jury could
reasonably

infer

that

the

defendant's

flight

reflected

consciousness of guilt, and flight requires neither the physical
act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven.

Flight

manifestly does require, however, a purpose to avoid being observed
or arrested."
1988)

California v. Crandell, 760 P.2d 423, 442 (Cal.

(citing California v. Cannady, 503 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1972));

accord

State v. Howland,

761 P.2d

579, 580

(Utah App.

1988)

(finding error where trial court gave flight instruction because
flight did not occur after commission of crime charged); State v.
Fairclough, 44 P.2d 692, 697 (Utah 1935) (finding no error where
trial

court

gave

flight

instruction

because

evidence

showed

defendant quickly left crime scene in victim's car with his family
and luggage, scratched victim's initials off the car, left lights
on in home, and went to family in Montana via a circuitous route).
With

regard

to

flight

instructions

submitted

over

the

objection of a defendant, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
noted that

"courts

[should be] wary of the probative value of
21

flight evidence." United States v. Williams. 33 F.3d 876, 879 (7th
Cir. 1994)

(citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483

n.10, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ("[W]e have consistently
doubted the probative value in criminal trials of evidence that the
accused fled the scene of an actual or supposed crime")).
Accordingly, that Court stated the "'probative value of flight
as

evidence

of

defendant's

guilt

depends

on

the

confidence with which four inferences can be drawn:

degree

of

(1) from

behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3)
from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning
the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning
the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged.'"
(quoting United States v. Levine, 5 F.3d 1100, 1107

Id.

(7th Cir.

1993), cert, denied 114 S.Ct. 1224, 127 L.Ed.2d 569 (1994)) (other
citations omitted).
Under the foregoing criteria, a flight instruction was not
warranted in this case.

As an initial matter, Madrid's behavior

does not support the inference of flight.

Paddock testified only

that Madrid was walking quickly toward his car and that he seemed
"panicky."

R.101 [128] . This would be natural considering Paddock,

even though he never saw Madrid on the premises, asked Madrid in a
confrontational and accusatory manner, "what are you doing in my
yard?"

R.101[127].

Any person in Madrid's shoes would likewise

step up the pace to get into their car rather than deal with
someone accusing them of being in their yard although they never
actually saw you there.

See, e.g. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489,
22

4 94 (Utah App. 1990) ("mere act of avoiding confrontation does not
create an articulable suspicion"); In re D.J.f
(D.C. 1987)

532 A.2d 138, 141

(defendant "merely attempted to walk away, behavior

indicative simply of a desire not to talk to police.

No adverse

inference may be drawn from such a desire") ; McClain v. State, 408
So.2d 721, 722 (Fla. App. 1982) (defendant's "behavior which, taken
for its most insidious implications, indicated only that he wanted
to avoid police, could not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that
he was engaged in criminal activity").
In addition, Paddock never stated that Madrid was running or
otherwise attempting to avoid being observed by Paddock.

Indeed,

Paddock testified that Madrid was walking along the same sidewalk
where Paddock stood, as opposed to walking on the other side of the
street or in the opposite direction.
truly

attempting

to avoid

observation,

differently under the circumstances.
698

(evidence merited

R.101[127].

flight

If Madrid were

he would

have

behaved

Cf. Fairclough, 44 P. 2d at

instruction

where

defendant

took

circuitous route to family home out of state and avoided detection
by scratching victim's initials off of victim's car which defendant
drove).

Hence, the inference of guilt "'from behavior to flight'"

under the facts of this case is not sufficiently supported by the
evidence.

Williams, 33 F.3d at 879 (quotation omitted).

Likewise, the evidence does not adequately support the other
Williams

considerations,

consciousness

of

guilt;

the
[]

inference

from

"'from

consciousness

flight
of

guilt

to
to

consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and [] from
23

consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt
of the crime charged.'"

Id, (quotation omitted).

As noted above,

Paddock testified that he asked Madrid what he was doing in the
yard as Madrid approached him on the sidewalk.

R.101 [127] . Given

that Madrid was never in the yard, such an odd question would have
certainly alerted him to some sort of guilt and prompted

his

quickened pace toward his car. Additionally, Madrid likely saw his
the other man running toward the car at the same time that Paddock
questioned Madrid, thereby heightening his sense of guilt
something

that

the

other

man

did

and/or

was

running

for

from.

R.101 [128] .
However, as noted by Utah courts and other jurisdictions,
flight and a general consciousness of guilt does not in and of
itself imply a consciousness of guilt for the particular crime
charged.

See Talbot, 792 P.2d

Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 581

at 494 n.10; United States v.

(9th Cir. 1988); United States v.

Rodriguez, 53 F.3d 1439, 1451 (7th Cir. 1995) . "The inference from
proof of an unfocused consciousness of guilt to consciousness of
guilt

concerning

problematic.
with

the

crime

charged

has

proven

especially

Flight and concealment of identity can be consistent

innocence,

Government,"

or

with

Silverman,

guilt

of

861 F.3d

misconduct
at

unknown

581, or,

to

the

in this case,

Paddock.
In

fact,

the

flight

evidence

here

does

not

inference of guilt of the particular crime charged.

support

an

As noted supra

Point I, at most, the evidence suggests that Madrid was looking at
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a van down the street when the other man seized on an opportunity
to break

into the Paddock-Reeves home.

Nothing suggests that

Madrid was an accomplice to the burglary, or even knew that such
was going on when he and the other person got into the red car
together and drove off.

Indeed, he was walking up the street where

he was looking at a van toward the house when Paddock saw him, and
not away from it as might be expected if he had just been involved
in the burglary of it.

R.101 [127].

Yet, even if Madrid had

realized at some point that the other man had burgled the home, and
therefore harbored a "consciousness of guilt concerning the crime
charged, " his
adequately

alleged

support

the

haste

to

inference

guilt" for the burglary.

get

into

the

that Madrid

car

would

harbored

Williams, 33 F.3d at 879.

not

"actual

Rather, it

merely indicates that he wished to get out of a sticky situation
quickly.
giving

Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law in

the

flight

instruction

supported by the evidence.

where

such

was

not

adequately

See Howland, 761 P.2d at 580 (finding

reversible error where trial court submitted flight instruction
unsupported by evidence).
As a final matter, the trial court's error merits reversal
because it was prejudicial to Madrid's case.
at 576

See Bales, 675 P. 2d

(applying harmless error analysis in assessing impact of

flight instruction).

As noted by the Seventh Circuit,

M/

[b]ecause

the probative value of flight evidence is often slight, there is a
danger that a flight instruction will isolate and give undue weight
to such evidence.7"

United States v. Rodriguez, 53 F.3d 1439, 1451
25

(7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Levine, 5 F.3d 1100, 1107
(7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 114 S.Ct. 1224, 127 L.Ed.2d

569

(1994)) .
This danger is particularly acute where, as here, the evidence
against

the defendant

strongly

is entirely circumstantial

suggest guilt.

Cf., Bales, 675 P.2d

and does not

at 576

(noting

"[e]ven if there had been no evidence of flight, . . . the other
evidence provided an ample basis for conviction") . As noted supra
Point I, there is no direct evidence of Madrid's guilt, such as an
eyewitness or the testimony of the other person seen running out of
the yard which might implicate Madrid in the crime.

Cf. id. (ample

evidence for conviction even if flight instruction was error where
there was eyewitness testimony and codefendant was in possession of
jewelry taken from crime scene).
evidence

in

involvement

the

present

case

in and knowledge

Moreover, the circumstantial
is

ambiguous

of the burglary,

"reasonable hypothesis of innocence."

as

to

leaving

Madrid's
open a

Hill, 727 P.2d at 222.

Accordingly, where the evidence in the present case does not
amply suggest guilt, the trial court's error in giving a flight
instruction likely "'isolate[d] and g[a]ve undue weight to such
evidence.'"
1107) .

Rodriguez, 53 F.3d at 1451 (quoting Levine, 5 F.3d at

Consequently,

the

jury was

likely

decision to convict Madrid of burglary.
error

is

not

conviction.

harmless

and

merits

swayed

the

Hence, the trial court's

reversal

See, e.g. Howland, 761 P.2d at 580.
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toward

of

the

burglary

CONCLUSION
Madrid

respectfully

requests

this

Court

to reverse

the

burglary and attempted theft convictions for insufficient evidence.
Should the Court find sufficient evidence, Madrid requests that his
convictions be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on
the basis that the trial court committed harmful error in giving a
flight instruction that was not justified by the evidence.
SUBMITTED this IA*,

day of March, 1999.
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SANDY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER OF JUDGMENT,
SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

FRANK MADRID,
DOB: 08/24/70
Defendant.

CASE NO. 981400069 FS
JUDGE ROGER A. LIVINGSTON
CLERK: C. Farnsworth
DATE: 06/04/98

The defendant present with Abbie Murray counsel and having been fully advised of his
rights and the State being represented through Jennifer Barton, there being no legal reason why
sentence should not be imposed, the defendant having been convicted by a finding of guilt to
Count I as charged, BURGLARY, a Class 2nd Degree Felony, and Count n as amended to a
lesser and included offense, ATTEMPTED THEFT, a Class "A" Misdemeanor, is hereby
sentenced as follows:
Count I, sentenced to an indeteterminate term of from 1 - 1 5 years.
Count U, sentenced to 365 days incarceration to run consecutively to Count I and both
Counts to run consecutively to time now serving at the Utah State Prison.
Deft was sentenced without a pre-sentence report.
DATED this 4th day of June, 1998.

MAILING/FAX CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I mailed or faxed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Judgment, Sentence Order to the following:
UTAH STATE PRISON RECORDS
Fax No: (801) 576-4028
SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Fax No: (801) 468-2642
BOARD OF PARDONS
Attn: JULIE S.
Fax: (801) 261-6481
LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
Fax No. (801) 532-0330
FRANK MADRID
Inmate, Utah State Prison
Fax: (801)

DATED this 4th day of June, 1998.

C.LFamsworth, Clerk

